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Salter concludes his series with “Race and Nation in the Universities,” a look at the university as an elite institution that is hostile to the traditional people and culture of Australia. (For a discussion of these issues in American universities emphasizing Liberal influence, see Why are Professors Liberals?—A Corroboration of The Culture of Critique). Again the legacy of Franz Boas is center stage:|
Indirect evidence that the ghost of Franz Boas still haunts the antipodean ivory tower comes from leading scholars of ethnicity and nationalism who I contacted. They could not name one Australian scholar who professes biosocial theory. … No political science or sociology department reported a scholar basing his or her research or teaching on behavioural biology. The skew towards Marxist and other environmental theories means that scholars of nationality do not know what to do with the wealth of findings drawn from evolutionary psychology, ethology, and sociobiology—except ignore them.
As in America, the dominant scholarly paradigm is that nations are social constructs in which the ancient ethnic core counts for nothing. Although Salter highlights some recent scholarly work that challenges this perspective, it is clear that the traditional concept of nations as having an ethnic core is still marginalized. In the dominant paradigm, Anglo ethnicity is seen “mainly as a risk factor for racism, but immigrant ethnicity as a legitimate and rich human value.” In the work of one professor,
Anglo racism and privilege, and immigrant victimhood, are treated as axiomatic. For example, the “new racism” is held to be a distinctively Anglo view of the nation as assimilationist, ethnocultural, or egalitarian, a narrow conception at odds with the civic nationalism on which multiculturalism is based. Egalitarian images of Australia are a form of Anglo racism, it is argued, because they deny the supposed reality of Anglo privilege.
There is the typical double standard where a professor “calls for minorities to organise ethnically to advance their corporate interests and condemns white Australians for any hint of doing the same.” The ethnocentrism and ethnic networking of non-White groups, such as Chinese middleman trading networks, are ignored. The bottom line is that “Whites have no legitimate ethnic interests.”
The result of the left’s addiction to the proposition nation rather than nations built on an ethnic core is “the fantasy that manipulation of Australia’s national historical narrative can produce something that has never existed, a diverse ethno-nation possessing the same benefits of social cohesion, social capital and allegiance that accrue to real nations.” Not only has such a nation never existed, all the research indicates that proposition nations with a high degree of multiculturalism have less social capital, more conflict, and a greater sense of alienation than nations built on ethnic core. Yet, as Salter notes, the academics who come up with these ideas are richly rewarded with prestigious university positions and best-selling, lavishly praised books.
Salter highlights an early forerunner to the idea that Whites have no legitimate ethnic interests, E. Digby Baltzell’s classic denunciation of WASP ethnicity, The Protestant Establishment: Aristocracy and Caste in America (1964).
Baltzell treated Anglos as possessing no legitimate interests that might be threatened by other ethnic groups and thus by mass immigration. He clinically examined Anglo-Americans, and only Anglo-Americans, for any sign of ethnic solidarity, inevitably finding symptoms which he promptly diagnosed as immoral. He treated immigrant communities very differently, as possessing legitimate interests that are often threatened by Anglo racism but which would be wholly benign if realised. In this perspective minorities harbour no competitive ethnic sentiments, a most improbable exception from human nature.
Finally, Salter notes a seldom discussed cost of multiculturalism: lack of consensus on foreign policy. Muslims tend to retain a strong identification with Muslims in other countries, and Asians often retain close ties to their homelands. “The United States is declining economically and its ethnic bond to Australia will weaken as the two countries’ populations become more diverse. At the same time Australia’s Asian population is entering the professions in large numbers, making their loyalty a relevant issue. … Australia’s diversity is often praised for its vibrancy. It is also a potential asset to regional powers in attempts to separate Australia from its traditional ally.”
Anglo Australians are a subaltern ethnicity. They are second-class citizens, the only ethnic group subjected to gratuitous defamation and hostile interrogation in the quality media, academia and race-relations bureaucracy. The national question is obscured in political culture by fallout from a continuing culture war against the historical Australian nation. Many of the premises on which ethnic policy have been based since the 1970s are simply false, from the beneficence of diversity to the white monopoly of racism and the irrelevance of race. The elite media and strong elements of the professoriate assert that racial hatred in Australia is the product of Anglo-Celtic society. But in the same media and even in the Commission for Race Discrimination most ethnic disparagement is aimed at “homogenised white” people.
Salter’s solution is a resurgence of a legitimate sense of Anglo consciousness and ethnic activism:
One or more Anglo councils are needed, non-governmental organisations along the lines of other ethnic councils but oriented more towards promoting the scientific study of ethnicity and nationalism. The council should also advocate for Anglo Australians, broadly defined. An Anglo council, and ultimately a federation of Anglo councils, would defend its constituents’ ethnic interests—against defamation, exploitation and demographic swamping. It would demand full representation in multicultural bodies and seek consultative access to government. It would lobby for schoolchildren to be taught the true history of the nation. It would affirm its attachment to the land of Australia. And it would insist that if any people is to be recognised in the Constitution, pride of place should be given to that which founded the nation and provided its infrastructure, political and legal systems, culture and language. Representing the core national identity and the majority of Australians, such a council should adopt a conciliatory role to smooth ethnic relations but in a manner compatible with defending its constituents’ rights and legitimate interests. The effect would be to democratise multiculturalism and the immigration industry by giving the majority of Australians representation in those spheres for the first time.
This is a very sensible suggestion, sure to be met with all the fury and economic power of the multicultural industry, particularly non-White ethnic activist organizations. Charges of “racism” would be only the beginning.
But the good news is that Salter’s essay was published in a mainstream conservative journal in Australia. This is a very important development because it gives nationalists the intellectual firepower they need to confidently meet the arguments proposed by self-serving multicultists. Salter’s analysis clearly implies that the unfolding disaster of White dispossession could not have occurred without the dominance of the left in the universities and the media. The fact that Quadrant was willing to publish this work by a highly qualified academic in a mainstream conservative publication is a huge blow in the opposite direction.
If even one Western nation, such as Australia, turned away from its current path of self-destruction and suicide by asserting the legitimate ethnic interests of Whites, there would be a powerful ripple effect throughout the West. And that would be revolutionary.