- Registration time
- Last login
- Online time
- 1144 Hour
- Reading permission
India and China on parade|
By Jagannath P Panda
The recent upsurge in military exchanges and cooperation between China and India has focused on two contentious issues: counter-terrorism and joint military exercises.
The decision to conduct a joint counter-terrorism drill next October was announced by Indian Army Chief of Staff J J Singh after his visit to China in May. By using the military exercise as the centerpiece of Sino-Indian defense ties, both countries seek to use it to improve upon their confidence in each other.
Just before leaving for China, Singh said, "In principle, the Chinese have agreed to hold such an exercise ... both armies are interested in expanding military-to-military ties."
After Singh's China tour, an Indian Defense Ministry statement announced that "the visit marked a decision in the engagement and mutual confidence-building mechanism by seeking to hold periodic joint military training exercises between the two armies".
Though these initiatives are seen as a significant step toward improving bilateral relations, a strain of mistrust, stemming from long-standing unresolved border disputes and China's arms sales to Pakistan, continues to pervade Sino-Indian military relations.
Two additional issues - renewed Chinese claims to what it calls Zangnan or South Tibet, the Indian-administered state of Arunachal Pradesh on India's northeast frontier, and China's visa denial to an Arunachal Pradesh official - have added a new kink to Sino-Indian relations. With this backdrop, observers question whether the proposed joint military exercise will bring any difference to the overall course of the bilateral relationship.
Moreover, there are doubts and questions regarding the significance of the joint military exercise. Where does it rank in comparison to the overall People's Liberation Army (PLA) strategy of holding joint exercises with other major military powers in the region?
Chinese military diplomacy
From the Chinese perspective, a striking aspect of its military diplomacy in recent years has been to establish defense links through joint military drills. Chinese military leaders have given priority to a range of joint military exercises - specifically to search and rescue and counter-terrorism operations - to advance the interests of the PLA by providing its soldiers with exposure to foreign training and expertise and enhance its comprehensive modernization program.
As a result, the PLA's annual defense consultations are conducted with both global and regional powers, including Russia, France, South Africa, Pakistan, Thailand and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization member states. The PLA hopes that by pursuing greater interaction with other well-trained soldiers, it might be able to obtain valuable lessons and intelligence as well as develop confidence-building measures.
These practices fall squarely within Beijing's strategy to build a secure neighborhood before gradually extending its influence throughout the world.  Indeed, this is evident in China's efforts to enhance confidence measures, reduce troops and military forces along borders, enforce disarmament in the border areas, and increase the transparency of border defense. 
From the geopolitical perspective, China has increasingly relied on its military diplomacy - establishing a wide variety of security dialogues, joint maneuvers and military exercises - to advance its strategic ambitions. China's defense collaboration with India, however, started to improve only in 2006. The current joint exercise initiative is a carry-over of the first defense memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed last year.
The May 29, 2006, defense MoU between China and India explicitly mentions important contacts such as "frequent exchanges", an "annual defense dialogue" and "joint military exercises in the fields of search and rescue, anti-piracy and counter-terrorism". This MoU insists on observing "balance and reciprocity" in such military exchanges between the two countries.  This does not mean, however, that there is a willingness from both the sides to build a bilateral framework to confront problematic issues. Moreover, the critical question remains whether the exercises reflect an evolving Sino-Indian security framework or they are simply a routine engagement at the defense level.
Despite these developments, it appears that serious obstacles to normal relations persist at multiple levels. Undoubtedly, many view these defense ties, and particularly Singh's recent visit to China, as a positive development. One can see a greater emphasis on "pragmatism" in defense exchanges between the two countries. In support of this, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson has stated, "We hope to work with India ... to improve and press ahead with the strategic partnership oriented toward peace and stability."
Perhaps the significance of these exchanges is their unprecedented nature; not even in the prime days of the bhai-bhai (Indians and Chinese are brothers) Sino-Indian relations did this type of relationship exist. It seems that the proposed "joint military operations" are intended to bridge the communications gap between the two militaries. Both armies are in favor of inviting observers to their exercises, which suggests a "degree of comfort" with each other more than anything else.
Counter-terrorism as the locus
In the forthcoming October bilateral joint exercise, counter-terrorism drills will dominate the engagement. It is reported that 100 Indian soldiers will be sent to China to participate in the proposed training operation. This operation should be seen more as a reflection of China's interests than as a bilateral initiative.
The first open suggestion to include counter-terrorism as an issue in Sino-Indian engagement came from China even before September 11, 2001, when former Chinese premier Li Peng visited India in January 2001. In an interview to The Hindu, he said, "China is willing to cooperate with all countries which are against terrorism. Of course, India is one of them. China supports every effort to combat international terrorism through the formulation of international conventions and hopes that the international community will take further steps to improve the anti-terrorism international legal framework." 
September 11 provided China with the opportunity to revisit the sensitive issue of terrorism and express its interest in cooperating with India on counter-terrorism efforts. On January 12, 2002, during his India visit, then-premier Zhu Rongji said, "China and India have much common ground on counter-terrorism. The Chinese side is ready to step up exchanges and cooperation with India and other relevant parties in this field." 
Since then, counter-terrorism has often been discussed as an issue in bilateral relations. The current proposal for counter-terrorism exercises, however, should be considered an important development from the Chinese perspective on two accounts: first, China's own concerns regarding separatist activities in Xinjiang and Tibet, and second, China's counter-terrorism preparations before next year's Summer Olympics in Beijing.
Given these considerations, Chinese authorities have expressed an interest in learning from the Indian military's tactics and methods in countering the insurgency in Kashmir. Concurrently, India appears eager to improve its counter-terrorism capabilities for its 2010 Commonwealth Games by gleaning lessons from China's 2008 Olympics security preparations.
The impact of the exercises
Despite these complimentary interests and the increase in cooperation, it seems that the exercises are unlikely to bring about actual confidence at the bilateral level. This is partly because of the ambivalent stance China has taken on the issue of cross-border terrorism in Kashmir.
Since September 11, when both the Kashmir conflict and terrorism in the region came under severe international scrutiny, the region has become an area of international strategic significance. Nevertheless, the conflict in Kashmir is inextricably linked to inter-state relations. The issue is further complicated by the rivalry between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir dispute and, to an extent, the China-Pakistan nexus.
Moreover, counter-terrorism operations in the Kashmir Valley are further compounded by the constant tensions between India and
Pakistan, leading to a continued anxiety with the occasional direct or indirect involvement of China. Whereas China's role in the "war against terrorism" after September 11 has been praiseworthy from the Western perspective, Beijing's equivocal stance on the issue of "cross-border terrorism" in Kashmir raises questions about its credibility and intentions as a counter-terrorism partner of India.
In addition, while terrorist incidents in Jammu and Kashmir have been termed a "cross-border" issue - attracting consistent condemnation from all major international powers - China, though a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and an immediate neighbor to the region, has thus far avoided taking a clear stand. To China, the situation in Kashmir is a result of "ethnic problems and the sharp disparity between the rich and the poor, which offers soil for the long-term existence of terrorism".