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jay_dee Post time: 2014-4-28 10:41
MacArthur dictated what HE WANTED, just as other prima donnas did in WW2 (there were many).
He faile ...
"On 22 February 1942, President Roosevelt reluctantly ordered General Douglas MacArthur to abandon his hard-pressed army in the Philippines and assume the office of Supreme Commander, South West Pacific Area (SWPA) with headquarters in Australia. Roosevelt believed that General MacArthur had personally compromised the defence of the Philippines through serious errors of military judgment, but MacArthur had promoted an image of himself in the United States as a hero and brilliant general, and Roosevelt came under enormous public pressure to save MacArthur and give him a new command. MacArthur ordered his starving and desperate troops to fight on to the end, and gave them false hope of survival with a cruel lie that substantial military relief would soon arrive from the United States."
"Shortly after his arrival in Australia, MacArthur committed the first of a series of major errors of military judgment that were to show that he had learned nothing from his part in the American debacle in the Philippines. On 3 April 1942, MacArthur received from the Joint-Chiefs-of-Staff in Washington a directive concerning the conduct of the war in the South-West Pacific. MacArthur was specifically directed to include on his staff senior Australian military officers. He defied the direction by appointing only Americans as his staff officers. The American officers appointed to his staff in Australia lacked combat experience almost to a man, and most had escaped with him from the Philippines and shared his responsibility for the debacle in the Philippines. By defying the order from his superiors, MacArthur acquired American staff officers who could be trusted to understand and support his grand vision for recovery of the Philippines, but he deprived himself of advice from Australian generals with actual experience in the conduct of war. In the subsequent bloody fighting on the island of New Guinea, the absence of experienced Australian military advisers on MacArthur's staff would be reflected in poor planning and intelligence gathering, near panic-stricken responses to surprise moves by the Japanese, and unrealistic demands by MacArthur and his staff on field commanders."
"MacArthur possessed a deeply flawed personality. He was a commander with a mind that was too closed and inflexible for him to readily deduce an enemy's strategic and tactical goals or options, and this impaired his capacity to take appropriate measures to counter them. He ignored unpleasant realities when it did not suit him to acknowledge them, and tended to surround himself with servile staff officers who were aware of this dangerous weakness and indulged it. A surprise move by an enemy could produce paralysing indecision at MacArthur's headquarters. Coupled with his obsession with recovery of the Philippines, MacArthur's closed and inflexible mind caused him to reject warnings from Allied intelligence that the Japanese were planning an overland attack on Port Moresby. MacArthur possessed other character flaws that should have excluded him from senior command. He was a cold man who distanced himself from his troops and he showed an indifference to their welfare that at times was callous. He was a conceited man, with a passion for self-glorification, and incapable of admitting serious military errors or learning from them. His dread of removal from command verged on paranoia. These character failings caused him to blame his commanding officers in the field and his troops for his own errors of judgment."