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As ever, this was an "accident waiting to happen" and there were plenty blowing the whistle but were ignored.
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In this account, the Times identifies one of the leading protagonists responsible for the Boeing disaster, Mark Forkner. Forkner was “the Max’s chief technical pilot” – not merely a “test pilot” – who was in charge of the plane’s training manuals. More significant, he was Boeing’s point man who neglected to tell the FAA that the MCAS software “was in the midst of an overhaul, according to … three FAA officials.” Forkner requested removing the description of the MCAS from the pilot’s manual, and, as The New York Times reports, “Under the impression that the system was relatively benign and rarely used, the FAA eventually approved Mr Forkner’s request, the three officials said.”
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The other interpretation is that Forkner’s lawyer might be telegraphing a legal defense, diminishing his role in anticipation of a lawsuit. That may be less credible, given that Forkner himself was a former FAA employee, thus in effect a revolving-door technological lobbyist (unregistered) who would therefore be well placed to deceive the FAA training-certification engineers into approving whatever training cover-ups Boeing needed to hide to sell more airplanes. Whenever the FAA pushed, Forkner pushed back.
- Why Boeing may never recover from 737 debacle
And this is a crime too: Recall that the genesis of this disaster was a problem of hardware, not just MCAS. The extra lift of the far larger-diameter engines of the 737 Max (placed on a different position on the wing) caused the plane to pitch up whenever it approached stall angles of attack at both high and low speeds. This is a problem that should have become glaringly obvious to the greenest of aerodynamics personnel at Boeing the moment the first wind-tunnel model was tested at angles of attack higher than stall (it may have even been obvious on even earlier fluid-dynamics computer-simulation results).
In other words, they shouldn't have even been asking, "what could go wrong?" As it point out above, it's "glaringly obvious" that someone would get killed with this s**tware.
But the 737NG is just as lethal as the 737 MAX, requiring huge physical effort to manipulate that tail fin.
The slap-dash attitude should shock: It is almost beyond belief that, once having tested and found a high-speed pitch-up problem programmed into the simulator in 2012, no one – neither the chief test pilot nor the aerodynamicists (the engineers responsible for the interaction of moving objects, such as airplanes with the atmosphere) – thought to check the wind-tunnel data or test the simulator to see whether there was a corresponding low-speed pitch-up problem.
I was negotiating a project with a customer once and pointed out issues. I was kicked under the desk by one of the Anglo f***ing morons in my company. The customer was also an Anglo f**king moron who must have heard what I'd said but didn't even respond. THIS is the sort of excrement4brainz f**king morons in the gangster-run, Anglo-thieved prison-states. These vermin just want to report that they've completed their job on time, when in reality, they've just done as little as possible to get it "done". It's like the movie, Gung Ho, where they had to complete a certain number of cars. Some ended up without engines in etc. but were lined up to be counted. Their managers turn a "blind eye" to these infractions because they're just as infantile. Whistleblowers are deemed to be trouble makers and never promoted.
And here's the same thing happening: But it was not until the 737 Max prototype was flown four years later – in 2016 – that anyone reported a low-speed pitch-up problem, and then it was not an aerodynamicist but, once again, a test pilot (Ed Wilson, the new chief test pilot for the plane) who insisted there was an issue.
Their a s**tshow species of dumbf**k who cannot be trusted with your life!!!!! And what did these ***holes do? They implemented the easiest but most lethal solution possible: Here is where the problems began to cascade. Since Boeing management had already imposed the MCAS Band-Aid (in lieu of a hardware fix, albeit a relatively safe version), the cheapest, quickest and easiest-to-cover-up fix for the impossible-to-ignore low-speed problem was to issue a new, and even more ineffective, Band-Aid to the existing MCAS. In the process, it changed MCAS from a relatively safe and competent fix to a disastrously unsafe, mindlessly stupid single-sensor solution. As The New York Times reported:
“The change proved pivotal. Expanding the use of MCAS to lower-speed situations required removing the G-force threshold. MCAS now needed to work at low speeds so G-force didn’t apply.
And like Tesla and Gangster Motors no one is punished: But what truly moves this tragedy into the realm of sheer predation and, indeed, criminality, is the (non-)response of the US government.
Cash is king: Consider that the newly appointed secretary of defense, Patrick Shanahan, a former Boeing executive, is already under investigation for allegedly lobbying improperly on behalf of his former company.
And with a serial bankrupt as war criminal POTUS, desperation to compete means they're STILL cutting corners: Additionally, the administration of President Donald Trump is rolling back safety regulations in the rail sector, in effect re-creating the self-regulatory conditions that now prevail at the FAA, reports Justin Mikulka from Desmog.
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We can only imagine what is next – allowing the criminals to regulate the prison system?